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Standfirst: János Kertész and Johannes Wachs discuss how complexity science and network 
science are particularly useful for identifying and describing the hidden traces of economic 
misbehaviour such as fraud and corruption. 
 
 
The rules society makes for the economy and its agents are often broken. Corruption, 
collusion, fraud, tax evasion, and other forms of misbehaviour are widespread and costly. The 
UN estimatesa that the world-wide annual cost of corruption is over $US3 trillion. These 
economic losses are compounded by downstream effects including increasing inequality and 
decreasing social trust. Certainly, corruption has received plenty of attention from researchers 
and policymakers alike. Yet it is unclear if these collective efforts are helping. A recent 
review by Global Financial Integrity suggests that, according to Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index, corruption 
levels are no better than they were 20 years ago in over two-thirds of countries.  
 
Help may come from complexity science. In the past two to three decades a growing body of 
research has demonstrated the potential of complexity and network science approaches to the 
study of various economic phenomena (Box 1). Because corruption and economic crimes are 
themselves complex social and economic processes involving many actors and agents, it is 
becoming clear that such approaches are highly relevant to the tasks of detecting, describing, 
and controlling corruption. 
 
The fundamental obstacle to a better understanding of corruption remains measurement. 
Indeed, corruption is supposed to be kept secret by the perpetrators and so can only be 
tracked indirectly, in a wider sea of data. Data on company ownership or on links between 
managers and politicians are not readily available. Many existing data sources, unlike corrupt 
actors, respect national borders and are not easily compared internationally. Any study of 
corruption using proven or ground-truth cases must contend with selection bias.  Traditional 
studies  comparing countries rely on surveys, asking citizens or businesspeople about their 
perceptions of and experiences with corruption, an approach known to suffer from biases and 
limitations of scale1.  
 
Fortunately, the situation is improving. Governments and international organizations are 
making big administrative data available. Enterprising researchers, investigative journalists, 
and NGOs are crawling massive amounts of social and economic data on firms and their 
owners. They are in some way mapping slices of the whole economy in their search for traces 
or patterns of corrupt behaviour. Recent research carried out on a variety of these datasets has 
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perhaps one unifying strand: the distribution and organization of such suspicious behaviour is 
highly complex and far from random. 
 
An important example in this genre is the study of public procurement markets. On these 
markets governments purchase goods and services from the private sector, amounting to 10–
20% of GDP in OECD countries. Data about public procurements are openly accessible and 
contain much information about the specificities of the bids, enabling systematic quantitative 
analysis of corruption risk with the tools of network science.  
 
Procurement procedures are typically highly regulated but complicated enough that skilled 
corrupt officials can steer contracts to insider firms, avoiding competition and ensuring 
generous margins. In fact, the share of contracts awarded without competition in a country 
correlates significantly with traditional survey-based corruption measures2. Mapping 
procurement markets as networks of contract issuers and winning firms reveals that these 
high corruption risk contracts are significantly clustered: if one suspicious deal is uncovered, 
another is likely nearby. 
 
Firms themselves have intricate relationships between each other, and corporations and 
individuals use sophisticated structures of ownership, parent firms and subsidiaries to 
minimize their tax bills. As highlighted by the so-called Panama Papersb such arrangements 
are often legal grey areas. Therefore, it is vital to map out the global ownership relations 
between firms. Recent work applied network science methods to such data to highlight the 
jurisdictions that serve as so-called sinks and conduits of the tax-offshoring industry3. 
Though a great deal of money ends up in the sinks, which are the stereotypical island tax 
havens, it turns out that the conduits through which money flows on the way to the sinks are 
often  larger countries, including the Netherlands and the UK. A recent and controversial 
preprint published by the World Bank discovered a link between aid payments to developing 
countries and financial in-flows into tax havens4. The study applied traditional econometric 
models to convincingly relate the timing of these flows. How such money gets from the 
World Bank to a bank account on the Cayman Islands is likely a complex story. 
 
In some cases, the analysis is more focused, dealing with a single country, for example. 
Thorough investigation of traditional news media and Wikipedia material has been used to 
reveal the evolving network of Brazilian politicians involved in corruption scandals5. Over 
the 27 years of observation, the network of corrupt actors evolves — most actors are involved 
in only one scandal, but a few key actors bridge scandals across governments and parties. 
Such a longitudinal, network-based approach is able to identify the key players in the 
emergence of a giant component of crooks. A systematic study of a major Mexican scandal 
using tools of network science has shown that the dynamic aspect is indeed important for the 
identification of metrics sensitive to corruption risk6. 
 
Identifying warning signals of misbehaviour in economic activity is one of the main goals of 
this type of research, and we expect a major impact on the fight against corruption.  For 
example, network science provides tools to select companies suspicious of collusion from 
public procurement data7. As data quality and linkages between datasets improve, methods of 
complexity science are likely to provide further useful insights. This is because economic 
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crimes tend to leave faint but interrelated traces across the different datasets in which they 
appear.       
 
Despite the great potential of these new datasets and methods, complexity scientists 
researching corruption need to engage with sociology if they want to move beyond 
descriptive studies of corruption to predicting it and understanding the underlying 
mechanisms. Sociologists understand that the complexity of corruption is rooted in social 
processes and that hypotheses about corruption should start there. Multi-disciplinary 
cooperation is needed to test and further develop models based on those hypotheses and to 
validate them with the help of empirical data.  Agent-based models are a particularly useful 
tool to explore such processes and represent a method that social scientists have already used 
to understand macro phenomena such as norms and social conventions that cannot easily be 
explained by micro behavior8. The stubborn persistence of corruption in some regions is one 
such macro outcome that surely merits further study from this perspective. Network scientists 
and physicists have a great deal to contribute to this effort at the nexus of data, modelling, 
and theory. 
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Box 1: Complexity in economics 
The economy is a paradigmatic example of a complex system, with its many agents from 
individuals and households to corporations, banks and the state itself, connected to each other 
by a diversity of interactions9.  If complex behaviour emerges from simple statistical physics 
models in which the “agents” interact locally and obey simple rules, it is no wonder that more 
extreme forms of complexity are found in the economy where individual behaviour is so rich. 
Yet mainstream economics abstracted away these idiosyncrasies by considering wise 
representative agents. Physicists recognize this as a “mean field” approximation of the 
system. Such approaches work surprisingly well in average situations but can fail 
catastrophically as seen during the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
In recent decades, and especially since the global crisis, researchers have increasingly turned 
to the tools of complexity science to understand the economy. An example is DebtRank10, a 
new networked measure of systemic risk in financial markets, inspired by the algorithms that 
power internet search engines.  
 
One must be careful in making analogies between the economy and physical complex 
systems. “Microscopic laws” for economic behaviour are far from being fully explored. 
Indeed, the rich field of behavioural economics demonstrates that actors significantly deviate 
from models of rational behaviour. Economic agents strategize and often consider the effects 
of their actions. On top of this, an “uncertainty principle” is at play: observations on the 
economy influence its evolution, for example when an arbitrage opportunity is discovered.  
 
